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EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

EUROPEAN SECURITY and reunification of Germany are bracketed together as the first and most important topic on the agenda of the Big Four conference of foreign ministers scheduled to open at Geneva on Oct. 27. The foreign ministers have the task of implementing broad directives agreed upon by the heads of government at the Geneva summit meeting in July. At the close of that meeting, President Eisenhower said the follow-through of the foreign ministers would be a decisive test of the true worth of the new "spirit of Geneva."

The high hopes raised by the summit meeting have been tempered by events of recent weeks. The possibility still exists that the foreign ministers will be able at the second-round conference to reach agreements on basic issues that divide East and West, and thus bring the cold war to an end, but western capitals now look for no more than a start in that direction. Everything depends upon the persistence with which the Russians hold to ultimate objectives they have not ceased to proclaim.

Secretary of State Dulles confesses that he does not know the real meaning the Soviet Union's apparent change of attitude toward the West. "We cannot tell whether what is now going on marks a genuine change of purpose or whether it is merely a maneuver. We have to have plans that fit either contingency."¹

DIRECTIVE TO BIG FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS

In the directive agreed upon at the conclusion of the Geneva summit meeting, July 23, the heads of government instructed their foreign ministers to "propose effective means" for solution of questions relating to (1) European security and Germany, (2) disarmament, and (3) development of contacts between East and West. The ministers were to take account of "the close link between the reuni-

¹ Address at annual convention of American Legion, Miami, Oct. 10, 1955.

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fication of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace."

In connection with the first item, the ministers were instructed specifically to consider:

A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provision for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor;

Limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments;

Establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and other possible proposals pertaining to a solution of this problem.

The Geneva directive added that the heads of government had agreed that "settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." The foreign ministers were left free to make whatever arrangements they considered desirable "for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties." The West German and East German governments will have teams of observers at Geneva. There is no present indication that they will be invited to take part in the negotiations.

At the outset, the three western powers had hoped to deal separately with the German question and had proposed that reunification of Germany be the first order of business for the foreign ministers. But the Soviet Union wanted to deal first with security, proposing an all-European security pact that would indefinitely postpone action on German reunification.² Linking the two questions in a single topic avoided an immediate showdown; the heads of government did not attempt to deal directly with the substance of either question, leaving both for future discussion by the foreign ministers.

Subsequent events have made it evident that there has been no retreat by either the Soviet Union or the western powers from prior positions relating to Germany and European security. The Russians have continued to insist that security must come first, and that no German settlement

² Reporting on results of the summit conference, President Eisenhower said in a radio-television address on July 25 "Probably no question caused us as much trouble as that of German reunification and European security."

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can be reached without participation of the Soviet-controlled East German government. Moscow's separate dealings with both East and West Germany in September served notice that the Kremlin is still opposed to a united Germany allied to the West, and that it will continue to resist German reunification except on its own terms.

The western powers have maintained their fundamental position that there can be no genuine security in Europe so long as Germany is divided, and that German reunification must be brought about by free elections. While they have offered Russia collective guarantees against aggression by a unified Germany, the United States, Great Britain and France have insisted that any future German state must be free to make its own security arrangements, with the right to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if it so desires.

SOVIET TERMS FOR ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY PACT

The Soviet government outlined its security proposals at the summit meeting on July 20, when Premier Bulganin offered the West a new version of an old Soviet plan for an all-European security treaty. The original plan, first presented at the Berlin foreign ministers conference on Feb. 10, 1954, had called for liquidation of N.A.T.O. and its replacement by a security pact open to all European states "irrespective of their social systems." The United States and Communist China were both to play a part but only as "observers." The 1954 version, described by Secretary Dulles as "preposterous," was rejected by all three western powers.

In the revised form offered by Bulganin at Geneva, the Soviet plan did not demand immediate dissolution of western security agreements; it proposed that the existing N.A.T.O.—and the newly-created Eastern counterpart of N.A.T.O.—remain in being for a period of two or three years pending establishment of an overall European security system. Bulganin explained that the new Soviet plan could be carried out in two stages, as follows:

During the first stage (two or three years) the states parties to the treaty would not be relieved of the obligations assumed by them under existing treaties and agreements, but they would be bound to refrain from the use of armed force and to settle by peaceful means all disputes that may arise between them . . . [and would] under-

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take not to take any further steps to increase their armed forces stationed on foreign territories under treaties and arrangements previously concluded by them.

During the second stage, the states concerned would assume in full the treaty commitments related to the setting up of the collective security system in Europe, with the simultaneous complete termination of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Paris agreements, and the Warsaw [East European counterpart] treaty. The groupings of states created on the basis of these arrangements would be abolished and replaced by an all-European system of collective security.

Most basic provisions of the original Soviet draft were kept in the new text with only minor changes of wording. Thus, until the formation of a united German state, the existing governments of East and West Germany would be entitled to become parties to the new security treaty "enjoying equal rights" with the other signatories.³ Collective security guarantee provisions were taken over from the earlier draft without change.

Article 4 of the proposed all-European treaty, patterned after the mutual assistance clause of the North Atlantic treaty, reads as follows:

An armed attack in Europe against one or more of the states parties to the treaty by any state or group of states shall be deemed to be an attack against all of the parties. In the event of such an attack, each of the parties, exercising the right of individual or collective self-defense, shall assist the state or states so attacked by all the means at its disposal, including the use of armed force for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining international peace in Europe.

Premier Bulganin told the Big Four meeting that creation of an effective security system on the lines proposed would "largely facilitate settlement of the German problem," and would bring about the necessary prerequisites for reunification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis. However, in the Soviet view, the prerequisites still included measures for "the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states," and full participation of the East German government in all future negotiations on reunification. After hearing western proposals at Geneva, the Soviet government continued to maintain that the German problem could not be settled—and "must not be discussed"—without participation by both East and West Germany.

³ Under the latest draft, the United States would be entitled to become a full party to the pact, rather than a mere observer. Red China would remain an observer.

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WESTERN OFFERS OF MUTUAL SECURITY GUARANTEE

The western powers did not spell out their security proposals in precise terms at Geneva, but each of the three heads of government stated that the West was ready to consider any reasonable plans and to take into account "the legitimate security interests of all countries," including the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Eden advanced a tentative three-point formula when he announced (July 18) that Great Britain was prepared to consider: (1) A mutual security guarantee among the Big Four and a united Germany that would pledge each party "to go to the assistance of the victim of aggression, whoever it might be"; (2) an agreement fixing the total of forces and armaments of each side in Germany, and in the countries neighboring Germany; (3) a demilitarized zone between East and West.⁴

The Eden European security plan went farther than anything put forward by President Eisenhower or Premier Faure. In some respects it appeared to be at variance with known positions of the United States and France. Washington and Paris seemed cool to the idea of a demilitarized area, or buffer zone, between the East and the West. Memories of the breakdown of the Versailles treaty provisions for a demilitarized Rhineland made France particularly skeptical on that part of the Eden formula. France feared also that creation of a buffer zone in Germany would set a dangerous precedent that might lead to establishment of a neutral belt across Europe as desired by the Russians. But most of the Western powers' differences were ironed out in later discussions and the Eden plan eventually was modified and merged with other proposals.

Broad agreement on a formula for European security was worked out at a meeting of the three western foreign ministers in New York, Sept. 27-28,⁵ and questions relating to Germany were discussed with Heinrich von Brentano, West German foreign minister. Although details of the plan were not disclosed at the time, its basic purpose was clearly stated by leading western spokesmen in the United Nations General Assembly. British Foreign Secretary Mac-

⁴ Later, in connection with disarmament, Eden linked the idea of a demilitarized zone with a proposal for "joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe."

⁵ Denver dispatches, Oct. 11, quoted Secretary Dulles as saying the President had approved the agreements reached at New York.

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millan told the Assembly on Oct. 1 that "We are confident that we can produce plans which the world would regard as giving Russia full protection against the threat of a reunited Germany which has chosen, as it well may, to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty."

The assumption underlying the western plan was that Soviet reluctance to permit German reunification was based on genuine fear of a rearmed and independent German nation. To remove that fear, the West would propose that members of N.A.T.O. join in a mutual guarantee against aggression by any state, including Germany. If the western offer was rejected, said Foreign Secretary Macmillan, the West would be "driven to believe that Russia's refusal to liberate Germany is based not on legitimate considerations of national security, but on the wholly illegitimate determination to consolidate her grip on one half of the country, and even to extend it over the other."

POSITION OF GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Two major diplomatic events in Moscow during September stirred fresh doubts about Russia's real intentions. The first was the Soviet-West German agreement calling for establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the West German Federal Republic; the second, a Soviet-East German accord proclaiming the sovereignty and "complete equality" of the East German Republic.

The Soviet-West German agreement, signed Sept. 13, drew both criticism and praise in western capitals. West German Chancellor Adenauer strongly defended the Moscow decisions, holding that establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia was based on realities—"since German reunification cannot be brought about without the co-operation of Moscow." Adenauer declared there would be no loosening of the close bonds between the Federal Republic and its western allies; that his government had not surrendered its claim to speak for all the German people; that its action in establishing normal relations with the Soviet Union did not imply recognition of the East German regime or acceptance of the present eastern boundaries of Germany.

Before leaving Moscow on Sept. 14 Adenauer sent a letter to Bulganin making specific reservations with regard to boundaries and the East German regime, and reaffirming

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the federal government's claim that it alone is "entitled to speak for the whole of Germany." Moscow promptly challenged the Adenauer reservations with an announcement through the official Tass news agency that:

The Soviet government considers the [West] German Federal government as part of Germany. Another part of Germany is the [East] German Democratic Republic. . . . The government of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to state that the question of the borders of Germany was settled by the [1945] Potsdam agreement and that the German Federal Republic conducts its administration only on a territory that is within its sovereignty.

Despite such widely divergent interpretations, the West German Bundestag unanimously endorsed Adenauer's policy on Sept. 23. The American State Department had previously interpreted results of the Moscow negotiations as a victory for western diplomacy.⁶ On the other hand, important sections of British opinion, and many unofficial American commentators, believed that Moscow had outmaneuvered the West by putting itself in position to negotiate directly with both German governments.

The Soviet-East German accord, signed Sept. 20, appeared to confirm the view that Russia was trying not only to enhance the power and prestige of the Communist government in East Germany, but was striving at the same time to bolster its own bargaining position vis-a-vis the western powers. Under terms of the agreement, the Soviet government handed over to the East Germans full control of their internal affairs and foreign relations, including relations with West Germany.⁷ However, Soviet troops now stationed in East Germany remain there "temporarily," with the approval of the East German government, on conditions to be settled in a separate agreement.

Moscow's diplomatic maneuvers gave little evidence that the Kremlin was now ready to accept western security plans as the basis for a deal on German unification; on the contrary, the bilateral negotiations with East and West Germany seemed to proclaim that Russia had the power to keep Germany divided indefinitely, should such a policy

⁶ A statement issued by the State Department, Sept. 14, said "the abandonment now by the Soviet Union of its bankrupt German policies is a tribute to the success of the constructive policy which the western governments and the German Federal Republic have consistently pursued during these past years."

⁷ Specifically conferring the right to regulate civilian traffic between West Germany and West Berlin, theretofore exercised by Soviet authorities. The United States, Britain, and France sent identical notes to Moscow, Oct. 3, stating that Russia had no right to turn over to the East Germans functions it had assumed under four-power agreements.

serve its interests. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders continued to profess an interest in the concept behind the Eden plan and other western proposals—a concept that had its origin in various prewar security agreements and non-aggression pacts.

Regional Security and Non-Aggression Pacts

BASIC FEATURES of all current European security formulas, including those advanced by the Soviet Union, had their origin in earlier regional security treaties and non-aggression pacts concluded during the inter-war years. The central idea of the Eden plan was drawn from the Locarno pact of 1925. France has advanced ideas patterned after other agreements of the inter-war period. Russia has incorporated in its current proposals features taken from its own earlier non-aggression treaties with neighboring countries.

Weaknesses and shortcomings of the inter-war security arrangements have influenced the attitudes of all the great powers toward new proposals which follow the same lines. The breakdown of collective guarantees of a demilitarized Rhineland made France extremely wary about all current proposals for demilitarized areas. Collapse of the whole system of European security after the Munich deal in 1938 made Russia suspicious of all western security proposals.

Former Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain was the first to revive the central idea of the Locarno security pact. In his famous speech of May 11, 1953, proposing a meeting "at the summit," Churchill declared that "The master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia . . . to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind." Churchill described the Locarno accord as "the highest point we reached between the wars: in essence it was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans."

The Locarno security pact was one of a series of agreements among the nations of western Europe designed to end the threat of war in that area by mutual pledges not

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to resort to force and by guarantees of existing frontiers between Germany and her western neighbors. In all, seven treaties and agreements were initialed at Locarno on Oct. 16, 1925, and signed at London on Dec. 1 of that year.

In the principal agreement, called the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy) individually and collectively guaranteed the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and France, together with the demilitarized Rhineland zone established in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. Belgium, France and Germany pledged themselves not to resort to war against one another, except in legitimate self-defense against a "flagrant violation" of the treaty. In case of flagrant violation all the signatory powers would go immediately to the assistance of the injured party.

The central pact was supported by a network of arbitration treaties in which Germany on one side, and Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the other, agreed to settle all disputes between them by peaceful means. In addition, France concluded mutual assistance pacts with Czechoslovakia and Poland in which the parties promised to lend each other "immediate aid and assistance" should one of them be attacked by Germany.

The "spirit of Locarno" was heralded as ushering in a new era of genuine cooperation among former enemies. Within a few years the policy of reconciliation initiated by Aristide Briand of France and Gustav Stresemann of Germany bore such fruit as in the admission of Germany to the League of Nations, reduction of German reparation payments, and recognition of the principle that Germany should be accorded equality of rights under a general disarmament convention.

In the early 1930s an attempt was made to extend the principles of Locarno to Germany's eastern frontiers and Russia's western borders, but by that time the rise of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany had vitiated the Locarno spirit and profoundly altered European political alignments.

FAILURE OF PREWAR EASTERN LOCARNO PROJECT

The Eastern Locarno project was initiated by France in 1934 with the encouragement of Great Britain and the active support of Soviet Russia. In brief, the plan con-

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templated a pact between Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly the Baltic states,⁸ which would provide joint guarantees of their respective borders, and bind the signatories to defend by force any one of them attacked by any other.

France was to serve as general guarantor of the pact's observance by promising to go to the aid of any party which became a victim of aggression. Great Britain, although not willing to serve as a guarantor, encouraged the Eastern Locarno plan in the hope of winning Soviet adherence to the original western Locarno agreement.

Hitler's refusal to join any regional security arrangement that would freeze Germany's eastern frontiers doomed the Eastern Locarno project to failure. In 1933 Germany had resigned from the League of Nations and withdrawn from the world disarmament conference in protest against what Hitler regarded as a conspiracy by the victors in World War I to perpetuate the *status quo* established by the Versailles treaty. The Nazi Fuehrer not only declined to put aside German hopes for revision of the eastern frontiers but also, in March 1936, challenged the whole Versailles settlement and repudiated the Western Locarno pact by sending German forces into the Rhineland.

Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland was the step that led to ultimate destruction of the elaborate system of treaties and alliances built up in Europe after the war of 1914-18. The Locarno signatories, minus Germany, held parleys in Paris and London, but took no action despite what they termed a clear violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties. Two years later the Munich agreements of Sept. 30, 1938, sealed the fate of the entire European security structure.⁹

Munich's enhancement of German power fatally weakened the network of alliances, mutual assistance pacts, and non-aggression treaties in which France had been the central figure. In addition to Locarno the French security system included defensive alliances with Belgium and Poland, and mutual aid pacts with the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) designed to sustain

⁸ The Soviet Union had concluded separate bilateral non-aggression treaties with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland between 1926 and 1932.

⁹ For sequence of events before and after Munich deal between France, Germany, Britain, and Italy, see "Changing European Political Alignments," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1938, pp. 263-279.

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the 1919 peace settlements. After failure of the Eastern Locarno project, France and Soviet Russia concluded a five year mutual aid pact in May 1935 under which each signatory promised to come to the aid of the other if it became a victim of aggression in Europe.

The Soviet Union meanwhile had built up its own network of treaties, based primarily on bilateral non-aggression pacts with neighboring states. Between 1925 and 1935 Russia entered into such pacts with a dozen different countries, including Germany, Poland, Turkey, and the Baltic states, in which the parties promised not to attack each other and not to participate in hostile undertakings with third countries.

After Munich, most if not all of the existing security pacts became dead letters. Russia abruptly broke off security parleys with Britain and France, and in August 1939 concluding the notorious non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany that opened the way for Hitler's attack on Poland in September. Britain and France, while honoring their commitments to Poland, were not able to render effective aid or to prevent the partition of that country by Germany and Russia. Soviet non-aggression treaties with the Baltic states did not prevent Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania or the Russian attack on Finland in 1940. Nor was the Stalin-Hitler pact allowed to stand in the way of Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941.

POSTWAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE

Efforts to reconstruct an effective international security system began before the end of World War II with the drafting of the United Nations Charter. Implicit in that document was the assumption that the great powers to become permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, United States, and U.S.S.R.) would continue to act in concert to maintain international peace and security. But apart from the general authority vested in the Security Council, the Charter reserved the right of all U.N. members to take individual and collective measures of self-defense, and made provision for regional arrangements to promote peace and security. Article 51 specifically provided:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs

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against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Regional security arrangements "consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations" were sanctioned in Articles 52 and 53. The Security Council was directed to encourage development of regional arrangements for pacific settlement of local disputes, but "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."

NETWORK OF SOVIET-SATELLITE SECURITY PACTS

The Soviet Union began forging its own regional security system in Eastern Europe while the war was still in progress, long before the U.N. Charter was framed.⁹ As early as December 1943, Russia concluded with Czechoslovakia a 20-year "Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Collaboration" that was to become the prototype for a new network of mutual security pacts binding the border states of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. The basic provision of the Soviet-Czech accord pledged each party not to join any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other.¹⁰

Russia negotiated similar security treaties with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia between April 1945 and March 1948. All of the pacts included a pledge against joining any hostile alliance or coalition, and provided for mutual military and economic assistance.

As the states of Eastern Europe came under Communist control, they bolstered the Soviet security system by concluding separate mutual assistance pacts among themselves. Thus the Soviet-satellite network eventually included 24 formal treaties, in addition to special agreements relating to various forms of military and economic cooperation. Marshal Tito's split with the Kremlin in June 1948 broke the solidarity of the Communist bloc, and led to abrogation of all of the pacts with Yugoslavia, but the others remained in force.¹¹

⁹ Czechoslovakia was under German occupation at the time the pact was concluded. The Czech government in exile was not under Communist control at the time, although it included Communist ministers.

¹¹ The Soviet Union denounced its treaty with Yugoslavia on Sept. 29, 1949, and that action was followed within a week by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Yugoslavia took the initiative in denouncing its treaty with Albania.

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JOINT GUARANTEES OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed at Washington on Apr. 4, 1949, by representatives of 12 western nations who proclaimed their determination to defend the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, and "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security."¹² The decision to organize a regional security system in the manner permitted by Articles 51-53 of the U.N. Charter was not taken until after the western states, individually and collectively, had sought to come to terms with the Soviet Union on conditions for a durable peace in Europe. The United States played a leading part in western efforts to assure the Russians that their security need not again be jeopardized by the threat of German aggression. At the first foreign ministers conference at London in September 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed to Foreign Minister Molotov a 25-year treaty among the Big Four to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany.

Byrnes pressed the project of a four-power guarantee in direct talks with Stalin during the Moscow conference in December 1945. He told Stalin that the experience of the United States in trying to stay out of Europe's wars had been "so disastrous" that he was confident the American people would support such a treaty to safeguard the peace.¹³ Subsequently, Byrnes circulated the text of a draft treaty, including provisions for maintenance in Germany of an inspection force by the four powers. His successor, Secretary Marshall, renewed that proposal in 1947 with the support of Great Britain and France but the whole project was finally rejected by Russia.

The breakdown of four-power agreements on Germany, the Berlin blockade of 1948, and failure to find a common approach to the German problem at a long series of foreign ministers' meetings, convinced the western powers that they could no longer delay steps to strengthen their own security. Economic cooperation under the Marshall plan stimulated the process of West European recovery, and the

¹² Original N.A.T.O. signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States. Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.

¹³ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (1947), p. 172. After World War I, President Wilson signed a treaty by which the United States would have agreed to come to the aid of France in case of unprovoked aggression by Germany. Britain signed and ratified a similar treaty, but the U.S. Senate did not act on the American pact.

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Brussels treaty of March 1948 gave impetus to the movement for a regional defense pact.

The original Brussels treaty linked Great Britain with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in a pledge of mutual assistance providing that if any one of them "should be the subject of an armed attack in Europe, the other parties will . . . render all military and other aid and assistance in their power."¹⁴ Representatives of the Brussels treaty powers met at Washington later in 1948 with representatives of the United States and Canada to develop plans for a wider security arrangement embracing the North Atlantic nations.

The resulting N.A.T.O. accord declared (in Article 5):

The parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The buildup of N.A.T.O. strength to implement the mutual guarantees of the Atlantic powers began in 1950 and plans were formulated at the same time to bring a rearmend West Germany into the alliance. It was not until May 9, 1955, however, that the latter plan was brought to fruition with the admission of the German Federal Republic as the 15th member of the North Atlantic organization. That event was followed by a startling turn in Soviet tactics.

Despite earlier threats that German admission to N.A.T.O. would prevent useful East-West negotiations, the Soviet government quickly accepted an Austrian peace settlement¹⁵ on terms satisfactory to the West, offered disarmament concessions, and accepted the western invitation to participate in a Big Four conference on major European issues. At the same time, Moscow launched countermoves to bolster its bargaining position in the forthcoming negotiations.

¹⁴ West Germany and Italy joined a strengthened Brussels treaty under the Paris agreements of October 1954.

¹⁵ The Austrian state treaty was signed at Vienna on May 15, 1955.

Security, Disarmament, and German Unity

FIVE DAYS after West Germany's admission to N.A.T.O., Soviet Premier Bulganin and Foreign Minister Molotov signed at Warsaw on May 14, 1955, a new mutual defense pact with representatives of East Germany and six other Communist states of Eastern Europe. The pact set up a joint military command of the armed forces of the eight signatories¹⁶ that seemed designed to create a visible eastern counterpart of N.A.T.O. forces in the west.

Apart from the provision for a unified command, the new treaty added little to previous mutual aid commitments among the Communist states. At the same time, the political objectives of the pact were stated in unmistakable language. Thus, the preamble declared that the parties "confirm again their striving for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European states, irrespective of their social or governmental systems." Substantive provisions closely followed the wording of the North Atlantic treaty with respect to mutual guarantees in case of aggression, and left the door open to adherence by other states.

A decision on integrating the forces of East Germany under the unified Soviet command was postponed until after negotiations on the status of Germany as a whole. The Warsaw pact would remain in force for 20 years, but would lapse immediately "in the event of a system of collective security being set up in Europe and a treaty to this effect being signed." The final communique at Warsaw hinted pointedly that German reunification could be brought about only after conclusion of such an all-European security pact.

SOVIET TERMS FOR REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

More recent Soviet diplomatic moves, coupled with statements by Foreign Minister Molotov in September, have confirmed the belief of western diplomats that Moscow's terms for German reunification have undergone no basic change since the Berlin conference of February 1954. At that conference Molotov called, in effect, for immediate dissolution of N.A.T.O. and the western security system as the

¹⁶ Signatories are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. Marshal Konev was named as chief of the unified military command.

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price of agreement on Germany. At the summit meeting last July Bulganin appeared to modify those terms by proposing a two-stage merging of the western and eastern security arrangements to form a single all-embracing system. But at the U.N. General Assembly two months later Molotov reasserted Russia's basic purpose to bring about dissolution of N.A.T.O. and to prevent participation by a reunited Germany in any alliance or coalition.

Molotov said, Sept. 24, that his government would insist that in the second stage of the general European security plan "both the North Atlantic treaty and the Paris agreements, and the Warsaw treaty concluded by eight powers in response to the Paris agreements, . . . be terminated." These treaties and agreements would be abrogated "along with the dissolution of the relevant military groupings" and be replaced by the all-European system of security.

Complete withdrawal of United States forces from all military and air bases in foreign countries has remained a basic feature of the Soviet draft security pact, and a continuing theme of Communist propaganda. Moscow made much of Russia's agreement to return the Porkkala naval base to Finland,¹⁷ giving world circulation to statements by Marshal Zhukov that the Soviet Union was now liquidating its bases on foreign soil and suggesting that the United States do the same.

Under the Soviet-East German agreement of Sept. 20, Moscow sought to strengthen its bargaining position by asserting that the primary aim of the contracting parties was to "bring about a peaceful settlement for the whole of Germany by means of appropriate negotiations," such negotiations to include the newly "sovereign" East German Democratic Republic. Should the United States, Great Britain, and France decline to deal with the East German regime on the ground that Adenauer's West German government speaks for all the German people, Moscow would undoubtedly place the onus for a breakdown on the western powers.

In all its recent dealings with East and West Germany, the Soviet Union appeared to be adapting its foreign policy to the fact that there is a military stalemate which lends

¹⁷ The Porkkala base, taken by Soviet forces during the Soviet-Finnish war, was retained by Russia under a treaty signed with Finland Apr. 6, 1948. In a new treaty, signed last Sept. 17, Russia promised to withdraw from the base within three months.

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itself to exploitation by adroit diplomacy. There was little evidence to suggest that Russian fears of a rearmed Germany were a major factor in Soviet policy; on the other hand, as Walter Lippmann noted in his syndicated column on Oct. 10, the Soviet diplomatic campaign seemed designed to undermine the western security system and to neutralize American power in Europe.

By perpetuating a divided Germany, the Soviet Union would continue to hold important bargaining cards: Eastern Germany and the lost German territory farther to the east. The Soviet contention that Germany's eastern frontier was permanently fixed on the Oder-Neisse line by the Potsdam accord of August 1945 has been challenged repeatedly by the United States and Great Britain. At Potsdam the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed that, pending a final delimitation of Poland's western frontier in a peace settlement, former German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers should be placed under the administration of Poland. The southern part of East Prussia similarly was transferred to Poland on a provisional basis, while the remainder of East Prussia was to all intents and purposes turned over to Russia.¹⁸

Chancellor Adenauer's West German government has declared on numerous occasions that there can be no settlement of the German problem without rectification of the present "illegal" eastern boundaries of Germany. The Bonn government denounced a 1950 joint declaration by the East German and Polish governments which purported to establish the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent German-Polish boundary. After the Soviet-West German negotiations Bonn reaffirmed its previous declarations that the East German government could not be recognized as a sovereign state, and that agreements entered into by the East German regime were without effect.¹⁹

LINKS BETWEEN SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION

In developing western plans for the foreign ministers' meeting, spokesmen for the United States, Great Britain

¹⁸ The cession to Russia was made dependent on "the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement," but the United States and Great Britain agreed to support such a transfer at the peace settlement. No such agreement was made in the case of the transfers to Poland. See "Future of Germany," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1946, pp. 729-730.

¹⁹ It called upon the United States, Great Britain and France at the same time to reaffirm their declaration of Apr. 7, 1954, that East Germany could not be recognized as a sovereign nation.

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and France have stressed the link between arms limitation and European security. At the summit meeting in July, British Prime Minister Eden linked his proposal for a demilitarized zone between East and West with a suggestion for joint inspection of the forces now facing one another in Europe.

It should not be impossible [Eden said] to decide that over a specified area to be agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West in Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides. . . . This could be a practical experiment in the operative inspection of armaments, an experiment which if it were locally successful might extend outward from the center to the periphery.

Foreign Secretary Macmillan referred to this suggestion when he told the U.N. Assembly, Oct. 1, that joint inspection and "thinning out of military dispositions" in sensitive areas of Europe could contribute to a growing sense of security on both sides. Foreign Minister Molotov referred cryptically to the Eden proposals in the ensuing debate, stating that Moscow had noted with "great interest" the ideas advanced by the British prime minister.

Although the original Eden concept of a demilitarized zone did not appear to commend itself to Secretary Dulles and French Foreign Minister Pinay at the recent New York conference of western foreign ministers, the idea of joint inspection and possible reduction of present forces on each side of the dividing line in Germany seemed to command united support. Whatever differences there may have been over details of proposals to be made by the western powers at Geneva, there was every indication that major differences had been ironed out during the preparatory talks.

Secretary Dulles told a news conference on Oct. 4, a week after the New York meeting, that the United States, Great Britain and France would go to the Geneva parley "more united in purpose and in program" than they had been in any previous conference with the Soviet Union.

